Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f236bc625c365195…

MALICIOUS

PDF

100.0 KB
MD5: 11ca30ba8b4916ad24f68e1ba95cd202 SHA-1: 501b5d40bd1e2fbcc0107ecf667faae6915db460 SHA-256: f236bc625c365195d0c5eac7253729d05c7aec080b06654a1d8d9c3e092789c1
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious File

The sample is a PDF document that exploits the CVE-2010-0188 vulnerability in Adobe Reader. This vulnerability is related to the handling of XFA forms and embedded scripts. The embedded script is likely responsible for downloading and executing a second-stage payload, although the script content itself is heavily obfuscated and truncated. The presence of the CVE-2010-0188 exploit and an embedded script payload strongly indicates malicious intent.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
a16e27261ae274f08a1736f7e5f37b4dc5109de3151c460d028f17647ecbc3bf
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 101625 bytes