Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f22558a00e376a32…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.21 MB
MD5: 3bfd3e692a38028477c40555515defa7 SHA-1: 8f3ee17d2eaf25bd5a1fd60ef0022a4732ae1d26 SHA-256: f22558a00e376a32a8622e70482c1f5692ed8ddb40d4bee77326e2ce0ce31802
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability related to Equation Editor. The presence of ".objupdate" indicates an attempt to force OLE activation, which is a common method for exploiting this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code. The exploit likely leads to the execution of a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001202.bin
eeafbdc3962844c2cba64ad5578e33cae4422d49697e6cfc18e5c434fbda8697
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1202 27209 bytes
objdata_01_off0001ca53.bin
1a9daf7f5259077ae9a7fba5e35fb7f5d70b6d43574b5a4ed8dc4e9c9ad184d1
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1CA53 475057 bytes