Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f1fe8278ca7c3f88…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.2 KB Created: 2021-08-16 10:19:10 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: 26403244f31db4597f956cb93d567f88 SHA-1: d2cbd7e756b1fdf0ed818a5fcf831565e84e108c SHA-256: f1fe8278ca7c3f88a2da0c8311d2fbba3dad6a7bdcee11ee74e26e78bab081b5
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF document exhibits multiple high-risk indicators, including a direct link to a payload and social engineering lures designed to prompt command execution. The 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' and 'SE_CLICKFIX' heuristics strongly suggest the document's intent is to trick the user into running arbitrary commands, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of numerous links to compromised WordPress uploads and disposable hosting further supports a malicious distribution pattern.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9985

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://bangtaisay.com/uploads/userfiles/file/88203811842.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://astro2sphere.com/admin/images/file/55990054088.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://alfa-pechati.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b02eea0e6951652a8991dd92c253ad5d/67761966818.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://plusbateria.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160711848c8e7c---86066020188.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.prieur-equipement.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/59760819830.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://telegid.tv/userfiles/files/81885716052.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pastadimatteo.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/34987244964.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tdfstore.it/file/jenowemeg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://krevue.cz/UserFiles/File/vofulisonorafupitisoxabu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gancza.pl/userfiles/file/91131326379.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pensiuneavalentina.ro/app/webroot/file/83350620628.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.harnoordesigns.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5vf5nnr7h1ohnbasbejj80aum0/55882311469.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jnnjhansi.com/userfiles/file/mivawojagojevivopegogis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feniks9.ru/ckfinder/userfiles/files/17197180882.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://doellefjelde-mussemarked.dk/images/newsmail/file/23520761933.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://anandamsanyal.com/userfiles/file/kudaretibibos.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://retentionstudentexperience.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160f16d5264742---rigafovujesapijed.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://abofahed.com/userfiles/file/97546812288.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.driftime.ee/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160cc5b22db9af---41726726403.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lycee-elm.org/userfiles/file/nadulon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.radiopopiatej.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a53533310e9---27123592090.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/YTWXjIUwRh0/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+get+steam_api.dllIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dd0b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDD0B 17976 bytes
SHA-256: d24a5768630ce2072cfbb12e4513a6b48eb2e6bb64b9dae8620e2901b302f709
font_01_sfnt_off00010ac6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10AC6 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off000122dd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x122DD 10704 bytes
SHA-256: 1ab52f859cf10ebd715a4ce58247c45580b52b7f0d47aed453f3447f7d047fbf