Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f1d181eee78b6efd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

72.1 KB Created: 2021-06-13 20:19:06 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 61a99199269c959b5e0aa2ed9eae7679 SHA-1: e839bf7ac4611fb24b6d2123feb7cef52941559b SHA-256: f1d181eee78b6efdf63fbc9c391ac1f7b1f804930de454106a931359a874bff5
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a lure instructing the user to copy and paste content into a shell, which is a common technique for executing malicious commands. Several URLs point to compromised WordPress sites, suggesting a distribution mechanism for further payloads. ClamAV detection and ML classification strongly indicate malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://archism.ru/uplcv?utm_term=check+grammar+and+sentence+formation
    • https://cristiandellavedova.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/hag4upb56snk64d679ngqvm9j5/91079083059.pdf
    • http://pferdefreunde-brueckenhof.de/sites/default/files/userfiles/file/32168751648.pdf
    • https://www.lenoir-elec.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/raap2a7jprs0ugqpg62e30mj25/95116203107.pdf
    • http://qboardapp.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/742b6fc8a13ddbbaae7e3c4dad69c1ff/35943094551.pdf
    • https://yingzhaoliuart.com/upload/file/woludikotokov.pdf
    • http://phantasos.org/userfiles/file/20700140702.pdf
    • https://betenagro.com/sites/default/files/file/zolefoxirodikamaduzonun.pdf
    • http://www.maoles.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16083b93bcd884---romusixari.pdf
    • http://www.majorisinvestimentos.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160970827e6d1f---perirotejevubit.pdf
    • https://www.paparazzirestaurant.com.au/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/1d8c715095325ceb67746441174666d9/pinonewofux.pdf
    • https://psychotherapie-dr-albrecht.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a50ce7007f0---kenileworunolopepaxe.pdf
    • https://majorsagilekvaros.hu/uploads/file/47777404055.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dd8e.bin
e93b58ab5fc15f12c5acf4da46cf5f7bbe78a5bf9876f9ce6e0d54c4d771c34a		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDD8E 5372 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000efa7.bin
5b9f6d2428cca413accb8f3503e4c4f8e0f6923c8067ac4b557518c8e92cafa5		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEFA7 10848 bytes

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