Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f1cadd1d86535e51…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

58.2 KB
MD5: dea2a4e91e8e1e437d1a5370822654dd SHA-1: 1de5ebdfa556199f466f2d79f7931b23c14bcbc7 SHA-256: f1cadd1d86535e516020ad2445dcd78daea6398629956003cded204f506b401f
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains OLE object data and specifically triggers the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic, indicating exploitation of the Equation Editor component. The RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristic suggests that the embedded OLE object is automatically activated upon opening. This combination strongly points to a classic exploit delivery mechanism. No document body or script content was available for further analysis, but the heuristics indicate the file's primary purpose is to exploit a vulnerability to gain code execution.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000138b.bin
7127173a5b2015c6c3d090fec63a3fd9e3a36093c805b0ebc03703f942e3f2e5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x138B 1732 bytes