Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f1adf3362d4a682b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

139.1 KB Created: 2021-02-23 12:57:05 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-20
MD5: de6521731d67ef44dd3f9387d9336f5b SHA-1: 783fdc7f53bbe1d97d2c9316d2d78ad26aa66486 SHA-256: f1adf3362d4a682b437b3dce0b71550271b2d5b55aa3cfbaf3499e22e1f586bd
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains or link farms, indicating a phishing or spamming operation. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external links are indicative of techniques used to redirect users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://seumenha.ru/123?utm_term=guerra+de+guerrillas+y+ejemplos PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/fuzomorikat/tgghcjH/losiru.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/zogobadakedu/c5WibUs/what_time_did_dodgers_play_today.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rimokukesezawuk.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437069/5bfe580f22c283.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/tibapopedeka/ibiggew/tap_titans_2_hero_guide.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xetepoz.iblogger.org/best_website_to_softwares_for_windows.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4460233/normal_5fe3bb152c9eb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4501045/normal_601f538846335.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://katexiru.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134576370/fiwujimu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jotapepikota/hbhhjhE/credit_hawk_phone_number.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sekokuvujiziv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134096710/subugubaf-bataxikowix-sojipibowewo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4460466/normal_602ee03e16b9a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bukivobiwizu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134097020/e8e2e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4388050/normal_60048be83d7aa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/juzilolawu/icgd629/jixol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/puvegipuros/KO4vjaK/pressed_flower_art_projects.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://joratunezawaxa.epizy.com/19998201328.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zibakogemigana.rf.gd/online_occurrence_reporting_system.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001e3d0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1E3D0 5488 bytes
SHA-256: 5d198c2f551ad792a23b234fc78c09642167b3a00efdca231bc4d09da1f76501
font_01_sfnt_off0001f679.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1F679 12116 bytes
SHA-256: 20f1f81f3d49706372596717ec8fb63e07fdc9d9597ef899e043e56315c827c1