Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f1894c65ce24a8ad…

MALICIOUS

PDF

92.7 KB Created: 2021-09-23 16:59:54 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-23
MD5: f1452c9a4de1c0cc94cc3cdec2346d64 SHA-1: 16aa71ee4aa5905709dbf4252fe5c507a460311b SHA-256: f1894c65ce24a8ad974f517feafd82fe368cedd1dc149888d701bf2b36298fb4
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a lure that instructs the user to install a browser extension or update, a common social-engineering tactic for credential theft or malware installation. The presence of malformed exploit streams and a high ML classifier score indicate malicious intent. While no scripts were directly extracted, the document's structure and embedded URLs suggest it is designed to lead the user to download and execute a malicious payload, likely leveraging a browser exploit or social engineering.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9929

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • Malformed active-content stream length medium PDF_MALFORMED_EXPLOIT_STREAM_LENGTH
    A PDF stream that carries active/exploit-looking content has a declared /Length that does not match the recovered stream body. Malformed stream boundaries and length mismatches are common parser-evasion/supporting evidence around Reader exploit streams.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://heorungminhphat.com/luutru/files/74518826164.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://around-sicily.net/userfiles/file/nodurifunezoro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bio-scan.com/userfiles/file/98784862012.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kingsfinancialconsulting.com/userfiles/file/tefer.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dishandspoonproductions.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/62205474738.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fuerst-architects.com/uploads/file/tuxasuxasoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://konemara.hu/userfiles/file/44784791596.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.brunosistemi.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16130b36624818---junogiwemilarasubotixo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://0851gay.org/userfiles/202109file/2021091104485070554.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ricarda-allegra.de/userfiles/file/tulifisube.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vektor-bezpeki.com/userfiles/files/48227864069.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kezheng.net/Upload/file/49185947627.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn--80aadq3ae7aa5k.xn--p1ai/upload/file/31609580859.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bd-sokolovska.eu/userfiles/file/66338372590.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://panama4d.com/contents/files/jevixizepavefolixekaxu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://amongelite.com/ci/userfiles/files/jezilufekegefuk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://beveragesgs.com/userfiles/file/64350569929.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.dr.schure.net/ckfinder/userfiles/files/riwukese.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://chinawin-consult.com/userfiles/59873743154.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://maybaobidinhdinh.com/upload/files/53015281521.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://baheth24cars.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/74909504754.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://phunhai.net/upload/files/jirawisavajidinetarobixi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://reclaimsplus.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7371f89deb9f2a9e1db8b05010dcb42e/16447840086.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://inlikeflintlogistics.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1612ea7415df48---50410327975.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ibrahimalsada.com/pics/file/tebugar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/FevRqgeaUVY/uplcv?utm_term=transfer+data+from+galaxy+to+iphonePDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001040b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1040B 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off00011c1d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11C1D 18252 bytes
SHA-256: b5b07f37ba49d714faa22653ffaf6618b7cc5e91a1aa9094386ef5984d212f28
font_02_sfnt_off00014b88.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14B88 11124 bytes
SHA-256: 571e0cb5b2fe8f0df4f8d8666b5f4e598483b9d3592550b61d49ed53d58b57e0

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