Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f1878cb9a7f86f47…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.1 KB
MD5: 231e8b49aa37db2b88ff19bf2ac587c9 SHA-1: bcefc0bb0f5c71c28ac905db58f1a0ea228b30d5 SHA-256: f1878cb9a7f86f474e7211e67a62e00d28efad6e70ca71944248ddfc77f91a99
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics indicates an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component to achieve arbitrary code execution upon opening the document. This is a common delivery mechanism for initial compromise.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b1.bin
aea5dc4950dd440badfa6ce450aaaf47549ae073134f3e09c2a154912d5f364d
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB1 1800 bytes