Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f182cdcf2dca0e6a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

46.7 KB Created: 2020-08-20 18:45:39 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 1825f757df49017da67e921c12448afa SHA-1: a7e52240ff93d228cf2a66f0ca6ca7dd0981d64d SHA-256: f182cdcf2dca0e6a399714407e7fa74127930cf888847ddd89f4e9194704cc0e
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a critical heuristic firing for a malicious redirector link pointing to 'ttraff.com'. Additionally, it exhibits a PDF link farm heuristic, with many links pointing to Shopify domains, but one of these links is also a redirector. The document body text, though heavily obfuscated, contains the same URL as the malicious redirector. A high severity heuristic indicates a 'Clipboard command execution lure', suggesting the document instructs the user to copy and paste content into a shell, likely to trigger further malicious activity.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=basic+html+website+templates+with+source+code
    • http://nawore.vazpintotennis.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130968917/7761093.pdf
    • http://files.minty-moon.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776521/4926850.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/7861/5189/files/73066710852.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/0002/1667/files/xamagajekafusetoz.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/5252/9829/files/2553137544.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/6123/2294/files/modul_bilangan_bulat.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/5485/7369/files/lifofikon.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0458/1346/5254/files/ringer_nfl_fantasy_draft_guide.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/6369/5770/files/batman_who_laughs_comic.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0443/6181/0076/files/hedging_instruments.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/4718/9670/files/51687437085.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5546/4104/files/4861407605.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/65294746239.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000785f.bin
29adeb28dca820947af3455b049f8ac224915b76f71ac5d48351c08bce1bb6c4		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x785F 5592 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00008b34.bin
9d36ecdd07402457275e9255919cfb5e990475bb2617995b9460433763bfea77		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8B34 10120 bytes

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