RTF malware analysis — malicious · f17f6ae98be61757

MALICIOUS

RTF

35.4 KB First seen: 2023-02-11

MD5: a214d1b36053f78b30ea05140819e6ca SHA-1: bf8eb73dc5e2b737c6961075b900c96f1616c9c2 SHA-256: f17f6ae98be61757a66441d0289c524f8dee95f0bdc18ee2e21171c2ab163807

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, a known exploit vector. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to view the content, which would trigger the embedded object's activation via \objupdate. This suggests an attempt to exploit a vulnerability, likely related to Equation Editor, to execute a malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000053c4.bin` `86ab36ddb5fbd3b462787a4d77a928ba5b965130eac8a872e5a87c196ad8dfbc`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x53C4	1399 bytes

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