Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f155eaa761651517…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

17.5 KB Created: 2022-02-11 13:20:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 30fe7b4eb030223b7c2a407459bddd26 SHA-1: 12d69a7812c3988d1008e02f799ece11bb138116 SHA-256: f155eaa761651517d852f805ef31e90f0d7d69e01c6b90c90cbe43a557d5894b
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a VBA macro that executes upon opening the document. This macro utilizes cmd.exe and certutil to download a payload from 'hanoi.com' and save it as 'quyet.exe' in the document's directory. The script also attempts to decode a base64 encoded file, likely containing the executable payload. The use of cmd.exe and certutil for downloading and decoding indicates a downloader pattern.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • LOLBin reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_LOLBIN
    LOLBin reference in VBA
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • cmd.exe reference in VBA high OLE_VBA_CMD
    cmd.exe reference in VBA
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
9206b6fee4a9bc6be66950fd3918e458ecb218ec2452fe2c8f75f7e83c49acab		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2203 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
8b9f9a224ea4b76c2516177258bc3856a0f29073bbac01d6dc3910c636645f99		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 15872 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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