MALICIOUS
126
Risk Score
Heuristics 5
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OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
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Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGEA valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
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VBA project contains no executable statements info OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
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Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTALThe same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL https://------condor%3Dderanged&ocelot%3Dtasty&hearthside%3Dubiquitous&celebration@nuak.link/MuqLtD?&contribution=honorable&depressive=abundant&cardboard In document text (OLE body)
- https://wwww.microsoft.com0In document text (OLE body)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In document text (OLE body)
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In document text (OLE body)
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
- https://docs.microsoft.com/typography/abouthttp://lucasfonts.comMicrosoftIn document text (OLE body)
- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIT_LicenseIn document text (OLE body)
- http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicCodSigPCA_2010-07-06.crl0ZIn document text (OLE body)
- http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicCodSigPCA_2010-07-06.crt0In document text (OLE body)
- http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crl0ZIn document text (OLE body)
- http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crt0��In document text (OLE body)
- http://www.microsoft.com/PKI/docs/CPS/default.htm0@In document text (OLE body)
- http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicTimStaPCA_2010-07-01.crl0ZIn document text (OLE body)
- http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicTimStaPCA_2010-07-01.crt0In document text (OLE body)
- http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/Microsoft%20Time-Stamp%20PCA%202010(1).crl0lIn document text (OLE body)
- http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/certs/Microsoft%20Time-Stamp%20PCA%202010(1).crt0In document text (OLE body)
- http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/Docs/Repository.htm0In document text (OLE body)
- http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crt0In document text (OLE body)
- http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crl0XIn document text (OLE body)
- http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crt0In document text (OLE body)
- http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/MicCodSigPCA2011_2011-07-08.crl0aIn document text (OLE body)
- http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/certs/MicCodSigPCA2011_2011-07-08.crt0In document text (OLE body)
- http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/microsoftrootcert.crl0TIn document text (OLE body)
- http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftRootCert.crt0In document text (OLE body)
- http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicRooCerAut2011_2011_03_22.crl0^In document text (OLE body)
- http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut2011_2011_03_22.crt0��In document text (OLE body)
- http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/docs/primarycps.htm0@In document text (OLE body)
- http://www.microsoft.com/TypographyIn document text (OLE body)
Extracted artifacts 10
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 1206 bytes |
SHA-256: 7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673 |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisWorkbook"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020819-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet2"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet3"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
|
|||
stream_014_off0003f52b.bin |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x3F52B | 566620 bytes |
SHA-256: b0a7e7055d5b66edffe76c7b1f32ec80318d696df6181f1536f27aa69517872f |
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stream_015_off0006f1fe.bin |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x6F1FE | 398152 bytes |
SHA-256: 0d5715bfb4def94d644e408c5ed714ea2ac557b061d036e7fdcf0a2bf1c990e2 |
|||
font_00_sfnt_off00004967.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4967 | 125220 bytes |
SHA-256: e383f3082616003f5c8a8d09c309db133f8aaa8f2db9d42c29b33298e1c37743 |
|||
font_01_sfnt_off00010a24.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10A24 | 110520 bytes |
SHA-256: 227554d0b5a58227001b6e593aa00373ed1ddb343a963c46474135cf10bf4818 |
|||
font_02_sfnt_off0001a0e2.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1A0E2 | 76060 bytes |
SHA-256: 3c2389af28fd13367508a8a1ce8c9fd6d5af0f1ba42f8721255caf7c3597c301 |
|||
font_03_sfnt_off00020b2e.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x20B2E | 70992 bytes |
SHA-256: 7a623d4a92f2f6df8a1db0673717d6602f7522e8d3b6b1904e9abbc2a06db5cf |
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font_04_sfnt_off0002b091.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2B091 | 360528 bytes |
SHA-256: 80313245e3c8cd907405bb17a856590dfca1d873e1e89c5ef8024b5ea1524f31 |
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font_07_sfnt_off000882ce.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x882CE | 346068 bytes |
SHA-256: ff37b045be3591e8cfbfa76f5dec51bee78deccafa1dc391d1edb36502c7f815 |
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polyglot_child_pdf_off000b0600.pdf |
polyglot-child-pdf | Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xB0600 | 1036824 bytes |
SHA-256: 1ea6a06392ee7adb67f001658f8d7c782f70d7b471e53cd7da2b10319f6405d5 |
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