RTF malware analysis — malicious · f13c595678d7f3db

MALICIOUS

RTF

85.3 KB First seen: 2024-10-16

MD5: 3a5c8bcf9e3e397a189d707f1fd1dbef SHA-1: d0c6b87ac3613accf91c7411757b262db75454d8 SHA-256: f13c595678d7f3db083e2d0be318ce3909fa8454e1179e4595563cacde138627

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded object will be activated automatically upon opening the document. This technique is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution, typically to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001169.bin` `714dc1fa2e415512b48d3a4d6e3a916a3a56f706bf6c11e99b3c483e9e9e56b4`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1169	1762 bytes

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