Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f13c33ffaed25277…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.8 KB Created: 2020-10-02 09:51:39 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: c516791d5005ac18a1f9489c1ad3f610 SHA-1: d2775c62a62313fe0d8c8f63a065c0a3c52483fd SHA-256: f13c33ffaed252775eb846eaa83b1725d34e1868cba6f3fd7290cfca057e5093
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable hosting services and redirectors. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure, suggesting an attempt to lead users to malicious content. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness. No scripts were extracted, but the link farm and redirector behavior are indicative of a phishing or malware distribution attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/pify?keyword=agents+of+the+apocalypse+study+guide+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://site-1037240.mozfiles.com/files/1037240/guretetozixub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038422.mozfiles.com/files/1038422/37505354510.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037189.mozfiles.com/files/1037189/64913635361.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.shanemorganart.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873983/toxof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.riversideartswalk.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738918/2523806.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://weguta.empressboatclub.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483281/7355611.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lesib.nicolasrll.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383813/temonebimowosibirig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4424fffc-5484-4bba-9ae1-59de1e6bacde/82368178952.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/29a02703-4f0c-4b66-ab7a-625e9ef5b76d/14783348945.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b221b3f3-e0bb-4723-81d2-907b72808b07/2463868842.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2ae25b8e-56c8-45ae-859f-ffe901095493/pogejukip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/01e305bb-0cf0-4f56-bc29-b67664476977/xuxekokogatowupaninuze.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/4997/4946/files/71092175117.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/0849/8591/files/6633421343.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006911.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6911 5412 bytes
SHA-256: 8b5e90bc4e50e493d88877fba92316e05a32c873d59d645cdcd30b51bac0f5e7
font_01_sfnt_off00007b8d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7B8D 10260 bytes
SHA-256: f81b63008ea04fa6119851d0fbe4698c4c98dee1bfc90b06b51654ee8581bcba