Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f132b3b80cf8c3c2…

MALICIOUS

RTF

10.5 KB First seen: 2019-05-16
MD5: 01cc2a55147257f9290a84bea00a4af7 SHA-1: 886dd5704c91b3c8d84387cc94fdb91dfccf80e7 SHA-256: f132b3b80cf8c3c21c8b67d01177293b589525bc3971116d89a46f1e2532405f
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object specifically identified as an Equation Editor object, triggering heuristics related to CVE-2017-11882. This exploit is known to facilitate arbitrary code execution. The presence of \objupdate and \objdata sections further indicates an attempt to activate and execute the embedded object, likely leading to the download or execution of a secondary payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001d37.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1D37 1634 bytes
SHA-256: 0d7a33b4add8da992769c303ff94984f0ad3edb3185c27c11013a714d732ff17

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