Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f131b571b77ddc9b…

MALICIOUS

RTF

3.9 KB
MD5: a01a1858e2291a839ce130f0225fa8eb SHA-1: 708c7dd4cf4b4bf24ee5bcbc08789a2b8642e546 SHA-256: f131b571b77ddc9b662635020bd8b7c83e040099478c57081c253dfe81f78da3
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates an attempt to exploit a client-side vulnerability for code execution, likely delivered as a spearphishing attachment. No further IOCs were extracted from the document body or embedded objects.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000c2.bin
d84d516e41934579488175d66a8d1cea8c04ebfd4c482cb3dba2fdead4c22d6f
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC2 1671 bytes