Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f11f41db3d8a991d…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

37.0 KB First seen: 2024-05-20
MD5: cb52daef850ff031df121cb8228ed757 SHA-1: 6f6286e9033efbf12ba88fd1ad043ea5f6efb52e SHA-256: f11f41db3d8a991d2d8eac064e6bf8218d27f64a33d46e6622df4b7cee72bcb0
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the embedded object is designed to be automatically activated upon opening the document. This exploit chain is commonly used to deliver secondary payloads, although no specific payload or download URL was directly extracted from this sample.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000004c4.bin
878863bcafffab4763612076e81ef8dd4e3f3452c972c5ac18c8856285e38f5e
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4C4 2112 bytes