Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f11ea393a8fc48d2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

49.8 KB Created: 2020-11-07 01:08:57 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-01-23
MD5: 4e22f1427787cf82b6c4a775500ebfb6 SHA-1: 55ae7d983c55e10b47c9de780ec3f2a51bb703db SHA-256: f11ea393a8fc48d28bd281fa0c79f0ce93a6b61e4fb052768b5bacd183f730ed
194 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffmen.ru/aws?keyword=mulan+google+docs+english In PDF document text
    • https://nigiseza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134462574/5e254130e3e0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xejibojap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134310503/2dd501f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://taxebalipawixu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134598188/aae8b14.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nudopimiga.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070212/5247311.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jakedekokobara.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381480/8536469.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vavale/upenn_class_of_2023_profile.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vasofirida/practical_finite_element_analysis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nafogexutum.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/laguvabezezopeboxuxate.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wonoti/network_topology_types_advantages_and_disadvantages.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/mijedusovineti/architectural_drawing_course_mo_zell.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://monirasuwa.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/71226119875.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tipakalif/58901623371.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tibovubowilex/botetourt_county_jail.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000061e7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x61E7 4912 bytes
SHA-256: 93f0dfaccd49ece0952e632ca0d7cc4571f3b0cf83bdaab7536d1639358d92be
font_01_sfnt_off0000728e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x728E 10516 bytes
SHA-256: 1943338b61a2d43819f92c5a192342c3279ca7cc4d28faa38a360dd82f15bfd3
font_02_sfnt_off000096be.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x96BE 16192 bytes
SHA-256: bbe35e28b961b0945fd643f2af6592a4ea3ce3d1ac193c1d4ba6f847f464b47b
font_03_sfnt_off0000abfe.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xABFE 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 9f355172d696dda274cac500966718f112ce76951f19577ac4888987ea6471b2

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