Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f1115e97b1717307…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.6 KB Created: 2021-09-04 14:16:53 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-23
MD5: 0e65388298228e84e7ab1034f9aa7bef SHA-1: 18ed36d7744188800d98bec2d20f52d583c25f2b SHA-256: f1115e97b1717307f4415a45991f513ddd1a6ac2a5bd30dcc51b4d80d1cda189
272 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF contains an embedded JavaScript stream and multiple external URIs pointing to compromised websites, suggesting it's part of a phishing campaign. The document body and embedded metadata mention "Learn windows powershell v3 in a month of lunches pdf", likely a lure to disguise the malicious intent. The presence of a link farm on compromised CMS uploads and disposable hosting further supports a phishing attack pattern.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9968

Heuristics 11

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ats-dz.com/userfiles/file/39399954427.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://hani-bee.com/userfiles/files/7595720541.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://watfordfairtrade.org/app/webroot/img/files/mujiw.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://www.adatechotomasyon.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a30b8e264ca---pawided.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.grandiosa.is/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/lu13b5drmo7a7bm56kqjan4tc5/siwuviximowotazanovuwu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://n-zvuk.ru/upload/file/lemidatagasaxitopomawo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://alismobile.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f0ded72e3029f8674ecd129137a9cd30/91925661664.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://grupomarsamo.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c24d9b1a489---22219165835.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ethiquedevelopers.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ee4d01b5ceab89305c2c3600a5448cfa/lovozuxadanuramoludanafi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mttrasportisrl.it/dati/upload/file/sinapukavajolaruleve.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.abaco-engineering.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1611263a09ccae---pumizozokibopubopexop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dmvassociates.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7597d3d1557b2786e2792825f32fcfad/mubetozulunuvoru.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.aserspa.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4bnvih6abcs3r3ds2bk2fh5pe4/gazoze.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://miguktour.com/FileData/ckfinder/files/20210703_C84794F14CE97934.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://churchliferesources.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160923b5a10749---14199252916.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aitrans.cn/UploadFile/file/F1202105300456538279.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.sarajevo-inn-grunewald.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160adf3a19ba13---xodavi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.alfainstal.pl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ad0e49b4737---sasiwol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://senzedigicraft.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f0efdac5e9f10f24390b90f98caf36fb/jokotiwile.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://viacaosaopedro.com/www/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/29670456449.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aradovan.com/userfiles/file/ridefowafisa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://buffagiuseppeinfissi.com/userfiles/files/bakosanukebumuji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/FevRqgeaUVY/uplcv?utm_term=learn+windows+powershell+v3+in+a+month+of+lunches+pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_00013908.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x13908 1665 bytes
SHA-256: d03b5ba495f2716ada8c822777e5b829f40f3590411dd8f5039d9a37251c516b
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='ImageMagick'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Mejagofu Zedoriki</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Learn windows powershell v3 in a month of lunches pdf. Superb ... full of real world examples, this book is a best friend of specialization. Olivier Devaul</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Learn windows powershell v3 in a month of lunches pdf. Superb ... full of real world examples, this book is a best friend of specialization. Olivier Devaul</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Learn windows powershell v3 in a month of lunches pdf</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='ImageMagick'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-03-24T16:50:09'
  xmp:CreatorTool='ImageMagick'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='f6646d85-d5db-435f-827f-6f3caf0dd225'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='0792c2ec-a4b5-43c7-8d21-1178fdbd0b80'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000d30b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD30B 11268 bytes
SHA-256: 79ab91bb7b22a03e840fd68cd2b144a03bb8eac3511c40edbaae63dbf37f3b85
font_01_sfnt_off0000ed62.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xED62 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off00010574.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10574 16904 bytes
SHA-256: 98f346bc2bd8c3b47d2bf5c0f524bc49392cbba84790c30a50639a70a8f0ce29

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.