MALICIOUS
160
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
The sample exhibits characteristics of legacy malware, specifically triggering heuristics related to WordBasic macro-virus markers and embedded Office document anomalies. The presence of 'ToolsMacro' and the OLE slack anomaly suggest the file is intentionally structured to evade parsing and potentially execute embedded malicious content. While no specific payload or URL was extracted, the combination of findings points to a malicious document designed for code execution.
Heuristics 4
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Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGEA CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
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Legacy WordBasic macro-virus markers high OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_MACRO_VIRUSOLE Word document contains legacy WordBasic auto-execution macro markers such as AutoOpen plus ToolsMacro/MacroFile/fileMacro/globMacro or named historical macro-virus strings. These old Word 6/95 macro forms are not exposed as a modern VBA project, so normal VBA source extraction can miss them.
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OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALYOLE file is 32,512 bytes but its declared streams total only 0 bytes — 32,512 bytes (100%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
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CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMSThe file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
embedded_office_off00002100.ole |
embedded-office | Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x2100 | 32512 bytes |
SHA-256: 3134cbb46d62db9d1b6581b79ff53fdcc162ea9c018e742ff4bb361667d1c447 |
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