Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f0d9112977054620…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

9.7 KB First seen: 2022-04-11
MD5: ea7281bccb3b96c2fdea37f73f64d468 SHA-1: e7af42078697d93a291f3441a83e1b08cd978813 SHA-256: f0d9112977054620863e0a2e63c75ba70c3fcca481ce51fe295d150998c0a677
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects, specifically targeting the Equation Editor. The presence of RTF_OBJAUTLINK and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics indicates that the embedded object is automatically activated upon opening, likely triggering an exploit. This exploit is designed to download and execute a secondary payload, leading to a compromise. The document body is heavily obfuscated and does not provide direct clues to the user-facing lure.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001639.bin
563406d6233016122e0c22ee131322f92b0cc1cb5694c45c29dbe65aff92e4aa
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1639 1950 bytes