Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f0ce29f017350b23…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.0 KB
MD5: 859c815bd56a761edb90e8d3c16a7901 SHA-1: 1000a83c1287ae4ee17a93fbb872a71679292b4b SHA-256: f0ce29f017350b23992245dc7ef4b92c8326179cb11cd460210617f23ec29e67
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, likely leading to the execution of malicious code. The document body contains only a numeric string, providing no further context for the lure.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000d1.bin
bfe3fd0e375736fa51fdb75bd3c78db7b00746fabfcfc2b8fc0a0e678901999c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD1 1800 bytes