Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 — Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f0be69f8a14b2129…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.42 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-10-17
MD5: a989f8f031b43dcc3755bf4ed6dc7ea6 SHA-1: b9a153cdb9cca20e7c5e9fa11c31a9c50e8b09dc SHA-256: f0be69f8a14b212961413f78ba3c60287d5a96c80c384fea50febdc98d7d8a1f
332 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: User Execution: Malicious File T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1204 User Execution

The file is an Excel spreadsheet containing an embedded Equation Editor object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This object contains a secondary PDF payload which, in turn, has a direct link to an executable payload. The ClamAV detection name 'Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0' and the embedded PDF's direct payload link strongly suggest a downloader functionality.

Heuristics 9

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 9

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
4dd1c3cecf876296a93f94e8aa9165dbca0cbba377d51f4709deed09fc8fa18d		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0008ACF0/ole10natIvE 1768 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0008ec00.pdf
beb135acfa2ebc03ea3c7c6b79b60dcb0de961dbb87359657e5f6e3c28db1a92		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x8EC00 908288 bytes
stream_004_off00005f60.bin
2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x5F60 252488 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0002b17d.bin
68d167e68895a344f3603a4efd0d8438eb8fdebe759cee48f2b4adf75c76c961		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2B17D 12100 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0002cf95.bin
50551000b9f90b3f445ee94749557d9ddf96697a74984b3ccf3d2bae66910750		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2CF95 15820 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001200.pdf
c3355a96e03d5a7c68e21b10df3e3b71e4128a07e0549391b4257d4aa4d70378		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1200 1488384 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006800.pdf
dfb6a397d91040a67f2e0c0d937e751c87bd28d9848a3d51b8327de93352ef55		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6800 1466368 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00029400.pdf
6aede0da740a8a2f0ced97240a573b1e301ad67fafd5151f36616f89038df6f5		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x29400 1324032 bytes

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