Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f0ba8e0ad05ed2a0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

3.3 KB Created: 2005-09-29 09:27:34 UTC Authoring application: Adobe PDF Library 8.0
MD5: 3a28237e987c52149ebe31ec5b2b36a4 SHA-1: b63b87cd255b09a4fb06f861f0d6aa0e393266aa SHA-256: f0ba8e0ad05ed2a02444b7f488198f11d3457e2115aab2a1fa9f39f492c69f3f
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious File T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and an XFA form, which are commonly used to deliver exploits. A critical heuristic firing indicates the presence of the CVE-2010-0188 exploit, targeting a vulnerability in Adobe Reader's handling of XFA images. This exploit is designed to execute arbitrary code, likely leading to the download and execution of a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains XFA image data with an inline crafted TIFF payload and shellcode/delivery markers. This is the data-bound variant of the CVE-2010-0188 Adobe Reader LibTIFF/XFA exploit shape.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0004.bin
570e94b05385bf7b22cf7934e8e8c98b06fed8e6c7a5fc810e9d46273d391838
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 4 at offset 0x1C6 35879 bytes