Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f0b6147e064b9dd3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

798.0 KB First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: c67e0be45ecd50f7f655149aa4788420 SHA-1: 112bbfd6fb163bb1dc829ec8216c876acb56ebd6 SHA-256: f0b6147e064b9dd3dc782f7a600d9053b9ba127655f762867cad5d7928f570e2
120 Risk Score

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007+, AES-128)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.