Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f0986ee9e586c78c…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

229.1 KB
MD5: a35a9434f85e7bc9c04836453510f35b SHA-1: db1a995fb52a1e45ee42193bb62373e19a000ba9 SHA-256: f0986ee9e586c78c3ad2ebcb511747986c4f513a7213760703c4367825d0c1b8
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with specific heuristics indicating automatic linking and update triggers. This suggests the document is designed to automatically execute embedded content upon opening, bypassing user interaction for macro enablement. The presence of OLE object data and the SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic strongly indicate a malicious dropper attempting to execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
04e3d27885727505df4f0b6c88cc351d20af7293284363e5377378561c13b968
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 20567 bytes
objdata_01_off0000b120.bin
1af484323aa51f0bc067b498458ed2106db428c7b743185ac9a6e18e7b648e31
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB120 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000c6c3.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC6C3 12297 bytes