Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f09869edfdacbec9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

2.47 MB
MD5: 597f47e3cf2a6a42c66f7e7cfaf7ce38 SHA-1: 93de426bd64ed648d4f41ae117c57e7924e9dc07 SHA-256: f09869edfdacbec96a8e06c065b050c8150bf935d4716156bd06eae55a26b8bb
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an encrypted OOXML file identified as malicious. High-severity heuristics indicate the presence of an Equation Editor OLE object, a known exploit carrier. The encryption with a default password further suggests malicious intent, likely to obscure the exploit payload. No document body or scripts were extractable, limiting further analysis of the specific lure or payload delivery.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.