Hancitor — Office (OOXML) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f096841c886b3752…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

743.6 KB Created: 2021-03-04 08:57:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 2e76ea73f95afb9893a3e8bfd622b94d SHA-1: d0f67a997a35d24f17829b56b71274b6a9cc1aec SHA-256: f096841c886b3752e0be947526ee7029860badb6af5f56cc9bfff77023f03584
380 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Hancitor · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample contains VBA macros with a Document_Open event that utilizes Shell() and CreateObject() calls, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary code. Heuristics suggest exploitation of CVE-2026-21514 via an embedded OLE object. ClamAV detection as 'Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0' strongly suggests the Hancitor family, which is known for dropping second-stage malware. The primary IOC is the file's SHA256 hash.

Heuristics 10

  • OOXML Ole10Native with payload/link indicators — possible CVE-2026-21514 high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Office document contains embedded OLE (word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin) with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. This is a likely CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape.
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
6f6d8f6f4c58ca39d3bb323bde9cc89346d34e61a235a1e1f122ad9c095d49ae		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 4599 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
1c7424fe40837cf69e81db96155f0412023a81c03102b108527fd69b2c072028		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 118272 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
de62af766779eff821a29afd044dc433bd9f29896470e818b99105f7f8b58dc7		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 109389 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
aee0a9eeb9294ac833e3910e4484a049f6badb2961bce5b978e629cdd6f104cb		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 37888 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
emf_00.emf
f2fb4550229a184fbb0b511f82089cb77ce54cc3d1f8e7001b236be1a4d83969		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5000 bytes

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