PDF malware analysis — malicious · f06bbabe2bcecb77

MALICIOUS

PDF

70.5 KB Created: 2020-09-01 12:11:39 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)

MD5: d949d4f7277d3a8ceadbba275146c0cb SHA-1: b490ecbe0af35558b4f8a4f92c47f3e5efdc7973 SHA-256: f06bbabe2bcecb778525385fc54279c15f128e62e559de6df206c182dccc8dbf

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains a mass external link farm, with one critical heuristic identifying a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains a URL that aligns with the malicious redirector. This suggests the primary goal is to redirect the user to a malicious site, potentially for phishing or malware delivery.

Heuristics 4

PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK

PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM

Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE

Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL https://ttraff.ru/wix?keyword=capitec+personal+loan+application+form
- https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/912de2_fd7a97614ce541c98669fcfe94801678.pdf
- https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/2074c9_9dd90e5b81ff45b3ac52ec9e16f73bc2.pdf
- https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_9457d1d0d431470e8844057789c5ded9.pdf
- https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_e77ac6e23bbe420dbf74ac012ce76e96.pdf
- https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/784815_d8b2c274094e4cb1843d858a644d2bd6.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/2732/5343/files/6137892750.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/6636/8935/files/31038347844.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/7296/9109/files/tegexiwegivixorapeguw.pdf
- https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/c7ef1a_18d61d7a544d4cf8a711457a15f52ea9.pdf
- https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/cafc24_9f5bf0d382a4468b91c452daed3851be.pdf
- https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/38bf1f_8d1f6ec46b594defa1c8fd0da9e52a23.pdf
- https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/f515ca_ae0e7230f47946f5b0536ac8a3a803b8.pdf
- https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/5b9365_28966a941c6c4a26a1eb50d86216fce0.pdf
- https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/6cfc61_6028cb53452a4f1f9fb466af8838bd33.pdf
- https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_e59049d69c4b45eb975085bc52814b9f.pdf
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
- https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_e77ac6e23bbe420dbf74ac012ce76e9

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`font_00_sfnt_off0000d70f.bin` `3489c0252c7921750a23d237c9e6b346b44c5b9386118d1c63f38ed361a1065e`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD70F	5064 bytes
`font_01_sfnt_off0000e82e.bin` `206abcb8207c8d763c2c6795c252fb65e789304a6d756463d1323600853dbc3f`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE82E	10672 bytes

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