Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f0292396f2316d17…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.14 MB
MD5: 5e0ee72eec9f71e0a014f8d77f722eda SHA-1: 98a4666b20e5a8ae6eb19e632f7e6de88bcc3af3 SHA-256: f0292396f2316d17eb8d83969916e28b1183b5b3d8412a49b78f995758aaa5c1
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an encrypted OOXML file, indicated by the 'OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML' heuristic. It contains embedded OLE objects, specifically identified as Equation Editor objects ('OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR'), which are commonly used as exploit carriers. The presence of these objects suggests an attempt to deliver a malicious payload via a known vulnerability.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.