Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 effc3924c84a1a63…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.1 KB
MD5: 247f396d38c6b159dcc8de15a7f0f0a0 SHA-1: 260ebf680d0c11bc32f1bd359d584b28987911e0 SHA-256: effc3924c84a1a63cbe0e1b96415abc8bdc48a6f4785cf98c5a5487e345aeef8
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object specifically identified as related to Equation Editor, triggering heuristics for CVE-2017-11882. The presence of \objupdate and \objdata sections further indicates that the embedded object is intended to be activated, likely leading to arbitrary code execution. This exploit is commonly used as a delivery mechanism for further malicious payloads.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000097.bin
eb29a17a36b80483272fb890d8991574a4c1b4b8beb5806a6c3e6ee1cfccd232
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x97 1913 bytes