Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 efe2bc68817e342a…

MALICIOUS

RTF

2.28 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00 First seen: 2020-05-25
MD5: 9896fa368f453550f6a98862e3bc4973 SHA-1: 154ed52b7f6aee5081943a8be9ff892ac22105d9 SHA-256: efe2bc68817e342a68e6e0ffb1eabc00a655e3ac0da03cbc56569327d9575967
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF file containing embedded OLE objects, with heuristics indicating that \objupdate forces OLE activation. This suggests the document is designed to exploit OLE object handling to execute arbitrary code. No specific family could be identified, and the document body was heavily obfuscated, preventing a clear understanding of the lure.

Heuristics 4

  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2{ In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0022c1f0.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x22C1F0 1413 bytes
SHA-256: c915255fd2149c1b471f59ba52362a668e88bdceed011e0834362cdd7fb21b31

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