Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 efd9b6d37ab16e86…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

76.5 KB Created: 2021-03-17 05:37:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: e9e2c140e4941430b966197842bf1263 SHA-1: 0f74ce9c9247f5d8fdf105a32e271b32394308b6 SHA-256: efd9b6d37ab16e86dc9cf339ff8bda09f1694cd519d41d7793b7893346256848
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML document contains VBA macros, specifically an AutoOpen macro, which is a strong indicator of malicious intent. The presence of Shell() and WScript.Shell usage within the VBA code suggests that the macro is designed to execute arbitrary commands, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload. No specific malware family could be identified, but the technique is common for initial access and payload delivery.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
3f42e2c2f4164e3b9d21d44993246212ddd6f57ca43ceb9c56234e0b09d9690e		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3020 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
8884ba5c318acc5765e517441cff95fd1ab6fb0c6999e77df213b9940278792c		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 30208 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 4 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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