Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 efaf0bdcc951c074…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.32 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-01-30
MD5: e10d662886606cced589afabf28a89fb SHA-1: 194997b3d91442f682de1c25f0fc6860641d2b7f SHA-256: efaf0bdcc951c074d8d1e68522c8e4265fb1f9db4780791514c69f31a846abea
150 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE indicates the exploitation of a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. The presence of embedded OLE objects, specifically `ole10native_00.bin` and `ole10native_02.bin`, strongly suggests that these contain the exploit payload. No VBA macros were found to be executable, and the document body is minimal, making the Equation Editor exploit the primary attack vector.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDX) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDX)
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
f81b5dc0f134bff67b32850863689811e3ff1dad6ed5cd918403c20cc4d6ab1e		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD00760CEC/Ole10Native 30803 bytes
ole10native_02.bin
513326fbd0875a3de55ef75f4b18c6efc8104f177cf11e26419f6a339ac69b8e		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD00760CF3/olE10naTive 1366 bytes

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