Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 efac11fcecbceb4e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

597.4 KB Created: 2022-08-22 11:34:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: 8570832c8e0f0551c131d9c4842adbcf SHA-1: 905e6932f6c3396d1c65251682f1e7592ce32c8c SHA-256: efac11fcecbceb4e6273852207a3875ac1edd69158415c3a0bba704e58adeb2c
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204 User Execution

The sample is a malicious OOXML document that leverages CVE-2017-8759 and CVE-2023-36884 vulnerabilities. It attempts to load an external RTF object from the URL https://sl-navy.office-drive.live/45/1/334/2/0/0/0/m/files-fe9dade2/file.rtf. This indicates a likely delivery mechanism for a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

  • CVE-2023-36884 — external RTF auto-load relationship critical CVE likely CVE_2023_36884
    Document auto-load relationship references a remote RTF file (https://sl-navy.office-drive.live/45/1/334/2/0/0/0/m/files-fe9dade2/file.rtf), matching the stronger Storm-0978/RomCom external-RTF delivery shape. Plain clickable hyperlinks are not enough for this CVE rule.
  • OOXML OLE2Link remote document — CVE-2017-8759 related high CVE related CVE_2017_8759_RELATED
    Document contains an o:OLEObject Type=Link whose external oleObject relationship fetches a remote Office-looking document. That is the OOXML OLE2Link staging shape used by CVE-2017-8759 campaigns when the remote document/WSDL supplies the SOAP moniker payload; the local file alone does not contain the WSDL body needed for an exact match.
  • External OLE object relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an oleObject relationship whose target is an external HTTP(S) URL. Office resolves this through OLE/object update paths rather than as a normal user-clicked hyperlink.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
emf_00.emf
1833637d2bb49186e0667ae0896ecc4d5b00b3383529f74edb75cad8748cd9b3		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 52 bytes

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