Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ef84435da9551950…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.8 KB
MD5: bd3cf0f6f1179ca0782c346ffb528c41 SHA-1: 97718b7645a104e3d8b2c33d9a6415dbf775afd7 SHA-256: ef84435da9551950e6806210348a28af158250219c2c1cd25e9eb9486ae3e862
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics indicates an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component to achieve arbitrary code execution upon opening the document. The document body contains only numerical data, providing no further context on the lure.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000c3.bin
8b9a1425b6e6d36397039f8754fe56501fbe1efcd9a4a528b0caf22dff0d522a
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC3 1719 bytes