Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ef7aab656cea1c8d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

63.8 KB Created: 2020-11-11 21:01:53 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: f4601d407f1ec7921218fab8c55ed69d SHA-1: ed96698bd3de3f38e1ff55afdc997d5b1eacdb86 SHA-256: ef7aab656cea1c8dfbd38296b0b3fc356692df52223f516c7cc68598248099b6
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains a significant number of embedded URLs, with heuristics indicating a link farm and redirection to malicious infrastructure. The presence of links like 'https://gettraff.ru/aws?utm_term=cm+to+meters+worksheet' and numerous others hosted on disposable domains strongly suggests a phishing or spam campaign designed to lead users to malicious sites. The ML classifier also flagged this PDF with high confidence.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/aws?utm_term=cm+to+meters+worksheet
    • https://netaxodesu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134367037/vogep-xisoserep.pdf
    • https://rogidalot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636841/baxorixofajedu.pdf
    • https://welofubevi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856084/zazenuvologaruf-javixudilere-gufomegufuso-xojidut.pdf
    • https://xurajozut.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134371968/047d25a4.pdf
    • https://zonisobeb.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134333784/datitasuxugalugegus.pdf
    • https://fanavepuru.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871984/jaxanisomon-fajewufutorusap-fevapetawusisem.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369163/normal_5f9a60a6a5b41.pdf
    • https://pomudada.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134382041/vojafawejadopabiki.pdf
    • https://lozulijulejibog.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857057/maregojumivuwopano.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d51a4d67-4b8f-4665-b0ed-485e21404283/geometry_dash_full_version_free_download_apk.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/9c22810b-3159-4d13-9de0-56d1e152b722/32093812778.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/robumuduluwise/cracking_the_periodic_table_code_pogil_key.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sezebepit/watermark_acrobat_9.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000bff8.bin
50bf48a60dab755fe0b187c309b9f10035aa933e39b53007e04ec44c3fb1ced9		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xBFF8 4744 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000d000.bin
51262ec1fe84d4c06c7ae9a73124aacb51d26fdb97c70b4f150d545093bb2f4f		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD000 10152 bytes

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