Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ef6db59e883cf13c…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

93.4 KB First seen: 2023-09-29
MD5: 9a4794eff8d8802ed0ab6d454325946c SHA-1: 326a8fe4adc9360cb143a0e0876eead496044fa2 SHA-256: ef6db59e883cf13c5ced9fb480ef143425476504226d411a6653b9d1508fa0df
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The file is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates a prompt to enable editing, a common tactic to bypass security. The presence of 'RTF_OBJDATA', 'RTF_OBJAUTLINK', and 'RTF_OBJUPDATE' further confirms the exploitation of OLE object functionality. This combination strongly suggests the document is designed to exploit CVE-2017-11882 to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000603b.bin
fbd97b311b25a9004e778558f12fbc5f454d71a9028b311cc729178883e6bdf1
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x603B 1808 bytes