Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ef4c6e65ec97c2db…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.30 MB Created: 2018-08-16 08:36:00 First seen: 2019-12-10
MD5: 775f04036c85f08660d0d131068e2c7e SHA-1: 6ac45fb1d6df1717e8aedc20c420fd0a3dd78324 SHA-256: ef4c6e65ec97c2db01c37caf9e8900fa62373df8c059728bbf35c78ad450371d
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains numerous OLE objects and uses \objupdate to force OLE activation, strongly indicating exploitation of CVE-2017-8759. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when a vulnerable MSXML version processes the embedded OLE object, likely leading to the download and execution of a secondary payload. The presence of large hex data blocks within the OLE object further suggests the hiding of malicious content.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1007KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 20 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002b69.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2B69 21569 bytes
SHA-256: 0c721a09c544b31a12a62ca292e88688e18fe172b879097ae7af632bfd099890
objdata_02_off00023049.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x23049 21569 bytes
SHA-256: 0e2292289f4e96e342bd446b67935fcf5681c6d347b482ff535191be4796d8d9
objdata_08_off00083ee9.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x83EE9 21569 bytes
SHA-256: a46d3d777b9fb8ad4ddb9534472ee1724e28f1de93e34a0ca797f25176f8b7d7
objdata_15_off000f4ff9.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xF4FF9 21569 bytes
SHA-256: 8f004afcd16a352de1945bd38e1e992d887a8c41b3db4260bab03c499aea93f8

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