Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ef3ca9d472c491f1…

MALICIOUS

PDF

48.2 KB Created: 2020-08-25 23:09:15 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: 3ffd81c25967d0f1041a71ffee63b15f SHA-1: b81e7b41d5d4f7230f0af2ae289bf2b6d01da97c SHA-256: ef3ca9d472c491f1c50a97e38a4a462c655c033c222215984f43fa798def57e9
194 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=blender+eevee+render+farm In PDF document text
    • http://kijerupup.oaklandauthentic.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775971/158887.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.allisonloehr.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969231/2216783.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.brendacsmith.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381095/movin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/9644/6878/files/20358483480.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/8094/0710/files/razovuwixusetutibox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/8912/5791/files/embed_from_google_drive.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/9652/9314/files/3838467240.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/1222/6200/files/bayana_agreement_format.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/0083/9842/files/wegidikuwideligaro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/4466/7553/files/traditional_ceremonies_in_zambia.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6643/3429/files/31440282366.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/7680/5023/files/2995057762.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/3495/8229/files/assemblage_theory_delanda.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5661/0969/files/basic_english_grammar_test_with_answers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/7730/2427/files/xofizedujakikow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/2640/7843/files/xojofajaximuru.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/3546/7669/files/geriwepipon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 3

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000074d4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x74D4 4984 bytes
SHA-256: 06834270c76fc32b651d08bafc1140cef67d14436c3e936cc2164f8e67e1ebbf
font_01_sfnt_off000085b7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x85B7 14756 bytes
SHA-256: 3aafa9a1f701ca91e3694b83e927dc88ce5c3e020080fad35db700e0fd334a9b

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