Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ef368ee1ae9277ea…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

55.8 KB Created: 2021-08-30 16:15:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000 First seen: 2022-02-17
MD5: 4ff09e062e290b40335f82defb897c3f SHA-1: f21cc398ea0243e087d62e9e1293c8abae006213 SHA-256: ef368ee1ae9277ea6b0ae8c685008e97efa5cb89dd790b0f41bdcc190635c54d
102 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample contains an embedded OLE object, specifically identified as an Equation Editor object. Heuristics indicate this object is anomalous and exploits CVE-2018-0798. This suggests the document is designed to leverage this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code upon opening. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was truncated, but the presence of the vulnerable Equation Editor object is a strong indicator of malicious intent.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Embedded OLE object word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • CVE-2018-0798 — anomalous Equation Editor native stream high CVE likely CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY
    Embedded Equation Editor OLE data contains anomalous native stream bytes consistent with a CVE-2018-0798-style Equation Editor exploit. This is treated as likely CVE evidence because the Equation object is malformed and payload-like, but it does not match the exact public matrix-overflow byte signature.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
a6ee66b6145a2edd2aebdd42227aa06621e3deaaa07169245f089d5c067cdf2b
ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 3584 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
0892187995d2768c6667fcdaac00d9d499dfe16a981c0e1fbcaa875bda5bdfbf
ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: OLE10NatIve 1405 bytes