Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 eef6bfdc05d17537…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

51.5 KB First seen: 2022-08-15
MD5: f9a90d282eafc2f2b5072072ddecbc32 SHA-1: 2592e9ebd3d914818ef50885cffcf4f4a63a754d SHA-256: eef6bfdc05d17537c7171396e8dc3a40af029d27e501456b0fd363f98e97c19a
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204 User Execution

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-0199 indicates that this OOXML document is designed to exploit a remote loader vulnerability. It attempts to download a secondary document from the URL http://jmcglone.com@198.23.207.54/https/shipping.doc. The document is encrypted with a default password, a common technique to obfuscate malicious content within Office files.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://jmcglone.com@198.23.207.54/https/shipping.doc