Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 eedc8daa9bddad8f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

536.4 KB
MD5: d8348b4892045530f5d0cb0e6f457abc SHA-1: 41a08ab229dc16e38fb8729356a4abaf4f52e3d7 SHA-256: eedc8daa9bddad8f0698198317f26abc60200c8aa5113fd670ca282afdfe2a75
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, with specific heuristics indicating automatic linking and update triggers designed to activate embedded content. This technique is commonly used to bypass Office macro security settings and execute malicious code. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic further suggests the document actively prompts the user to enable content, reinforcing its role as a dropper. No specific family could be identified, and no further IOCs were extracted.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000bb0.bin
bc71bf1f3cbd346efc84d7784f59fff3f75267d915133eff12621743284a5674
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBB0 171562 bytes
objdata_01_off00057e41.bin
9d9bc825f2fa5e0ed8db7dce6823e199ad9c775873472d42887214589f205470
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x57E41 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off000593e4.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x593E4 12297 bytes