Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 eebc8ef386157d19…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

5.5 KB First seen: 2023-01-23
MD5: 0ad7511ae8d3754a2e402e72310b2986 SHA-1: 212646063c0384d1d581a6d6dcb959f7a198d3fc SHA-256: eebc8ef386157d19bf5f4c25811b43c3ec1d350c8bb0907d2aa2080e07e94b9b
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1059.005 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates an attempt to force OLE activation, and the document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'enable editing'. This combination strongly suggests an exploit attempt to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000861.bin
4e30620a863801ebe400bee640434bcd188c145a8d1338bcf91f87ab52abeeea
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x861 1700 bytes