RTF malware analysis — malicious · ee2c1aaa130a75f5

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.57 MB First seen: 2021-06-30

MD5: eb47850ccaad05ee065c4fab3e3a7644 SHA-1: 98516498418eb0754905bbf6753a28cc052af96e SHA-256: ee2c1aaa130a75f5c882a2d3f1db2eed38c6a67efeb8a2104cba07c1fa0f02b7

220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of malicious activity, including embedded OLE objects and specific heuristics pointing to the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability in Equation Editor. The presence of 'Equation.3' ProgID strongly suggests exploitation of this known vulnerability to achieve arbitrary code execution. The document body contains obfuscated JavaScript-like code, likely part of the exploit chain.

Heuristics 6

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED

RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000011e1.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x11E1	53990 bytes
SHA-256: `9516fc41e1993a80aad20215ab067abbe18fcffff5fb39dbb5a52222c2fd1066`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): Wscript.ScriptFullName
`objdata_01_off0002fb33.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2FB33	346554 bytes
SHA-256: `196595185a2d3d8e72daa6bf758eace03ea55c6de4e10a4e69d526ce6f26b543`

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